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Since the First All-Union Congress of Soviet writers held in 1934, Socialist Realism had been of-
ficially considered the basis for Soviet literature and literary criticism. After the World War II its 
mission extended to the periphery of the Eastern bloc. Analyzing the aims of official propaganda 
through novels, one can consider the Soviet Union an “Empire by fiction”, to paraphrase Geir 
Lundestad’s fortunate title (who calls the United States an “Empire by Invitation”). To enhance 
unity inside the communist camp, writers often resorted to the perception of the enemy. Fearful 
and phantasmagorical, he is surrounded by an inspiring universe that unleashes the imagination 
of people. Then Yugoslav President Josip Tito became the case in question. “The Yugoslav Trag-
edy” (1951) came out three years after the Stalin-Tito split. Due to the acerbic condemnation 
of the “traitor” in the novel, together with a number of articles published in newspapers, Orest 
Maltsev, a stalwart of Socialist Realism, was awarded the Stalin Prize. Following Michel Fou-
cault’s bi-functional nature of power, I argue that in Maltsev’s description of the Yugoslav enemy, 
not only does the Soviet regime punish guilty behavior, but it also legitimizes itself by enhancing 
Soviet prestige at war (the indisputable winner vs. the shameful resistance fighters) and so rein-
forces Soviet values. This paper offers a new perspective on those founding principles in the early 
Cold War era and explains how fiction was used as the main tool of imperial soft power.
Keywords: Socialist Realism, Stalinism, Enemy, Cold War, Soft power, Imperial consciousness.
Советский Союз как империя, созданная словом
Р. Оклер 
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бургского университета. История. 2019. Т. 64. Вып. 1. С. 92–106. https://doi.org/10.21638/11701/
spbu02.2019.105
Первый Всесоюзный Съезд советских писателей в  1934  г. определил соцреализм как 
единственный допустимый метод советской художественной литературы и  литера-
турной критики. После Великой Отечественной войны влияние соцреализма распро-
странилось до периферии коммунистического блока. В статье исследуется, как именно 
официальная пропаганда использует литературу для достижения своих целей, а так-
же выдвигается новая гипотеза о том, что Советский Союз был империей, созданной 
словом. Проводится параллель с тезисом Гейра Лундестада, назвавшего США «импе-
рией по приглашению». Советские писатели часто прибегали к идеологеме врага для 
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того, чтобы подкрепить единство внутри коммунистического лагеря. Югославский 
президент Иосип Тито оказался отличным примером врага. «Югославская Трагедия» 
Ореста Мальцева (1951) была опубликована через три года после разрыва отношений 
между Сталиным и Тито. Жесткое осуждение Тито как «предателя» наряду с серией по-
ложительных отзывов, опубликованных в газетах, обеспечили автору романа, одному 
из столпов соцреализма, Сталинскую премию. Роман предлагает необычный пример 
того, как литература может быть применена к геополитике. Отрицая роль югославов 
в  освобождении своей страны, Орест Мальцев по существу пытается узаконить со-
ветскую гегемонию над Югославией. В данной статье, используя идею Мишеля Фуко 
о бифункциональной природе власти, я доказываю, что своим описанием югославов 
автор не только наказывает «виновного», но также возвышает престиж Красной ар-
мии — бесспорного победителя в войне. Сталинские ценности у Мальцева носят не-
оспоримый характер. Изучение врага в романе Мальцева дает нам представление об 
имперской политике позднего сталинистского Советского Союза, указывая на кон-
кретный способ использования литературной дипломатии. Приемы сталинской прозы 
показывают, что Советский Союз был не менее «мягкой», чем «твердой» силой. Кроме 
того, в статье освещаются главные идеологические вехи начала холодной войны и по-
казывается, как литература служила основным орудием имперской «мягкой силы».
Ключевые слова: соцреализм, сталинизм, враг, холодная война, «мягкая сила», импер-
ское сознание.
As the most significant outcome of the Bolshevik revolution, communist ideology in 
the Soviet Union occupied an indisputable place in its policy. For this reason, if one wants 
to understand the roots of the Soviet decision making, one cannot bypass the study of the 
communist gospels in which the aims and means of Marxism-Leninism are explained to 
the masses. These gospels are Socialist Realist novels. Indeed, since the First All-Union 
Congress of Soviet Writers held in 1934 Socialist Realism had become the basis for Sovi-
et literature and literary criticism. It set up for the artist such a standard as the truthful, 
historically precise representation of reality in its revolutionary development. This true-
to-life representation of reality was also aimed at the ideological transformation and edu-
cation of the workers in the “spirit of socialism”, as they said at the time. After the Second 
World War its mission extended to the periphery of the Eastern bloc in order to “roll back” 
Western influence as well as to strengthen the socialist camp.
“The Yugoslav Tragedy” (1951), the Stalin Prize novel at the outset of the Cold War, 
offers an extraordinary example of how literature can be applied to geopolitics. Denying 
the role of the Yugoslavs in the liberation of their own country, the book’s main goal is to 
legitimize Soviet hegemony over Yugoslavia as well as to comminate its integration into 
the West. This paper aims to show the Soviet regime’s literary diplomacy at the time when 
“the ‘operational weapon’ was culture”1. Analyzing the use of novels by official propagan-
da, one can consider the Soviet Union an “Empire by fiction”, to paraphrase Geir Lundes-
tad’s fortunate title2.
Unlike Lundestadʼs expression “Empire by invitation,” limpid, seductive and para-
doxical at once, my title “Empire by fiction” admits some ambiguity: on the one hand, 
“Empire by fiction” points to fiction, i.e. to literature, as to the vehicle transmitting So-
1 Saunders F. S. Who Paid the Piper? The CIA and the Cultural Cold War. London, 2000. P. 17.
2 Lundestad G. Empire by Invitation? The United States and Western Europe, 1945–1952 // Journal of 
Peace Research. 1986. Vol. 23, iss. 3. P. 263–277.
94 Вестник СПбГУ. История. 2019. Т. 64. Вып. 1
cialist values. As Hannibal used elephants to lead his conquests, the Soviet system resort-
ed to the narrative as an “Empire-builder”, as cement to maintain symbolically what was 
gained by economic or military means. On the other hand, one can consider this concept 
not from the perspective of the ruler (Hannibal, Cesar or Stalin), but “from below”, i.e. 
through the lens of the new empire’s subjects. If Lundestad says that the American empire 
is built upon democratic choice and consent, my expression suggests that to hold sway 
over the satellites, especially after the occupation of Eastern Europe by the Red Army at 
the end of the war, was, to a certain degree, possible owing to the communist narrative, i.e. 
to the political fiction that ended in 1991. This paper attempts to explore both meanings 
of such “empire by fiction” and to track down the fragments of the Soviet “imperial con-
sciousness” up to the present day.
The Enemy Escapes from the Book
In this section I will show that fiction has a direct impact on the political conscious-
ness of the reader and how, in the mind of the latter, imaginary enemies in the book be-
come real.
Soon after the end of World War II the former allies encountered crises where “tradi-
tional and instinctive Russian sense of insecurity”3 met Western fears of the Red invasion 
of Europe articulated by Winston Churchill in his famous Fulton speech. In the atomic 
age, when any direct conflict could have led to mutual destruction, ideology became the 
main battlefield for the two superpowers. These techniques included psychological war-
fare and cultural infiltration. In the Eastern bloc, the Zhdanov doctrine was implemented 
in 1946, and Stalin created the Cominform in October 1947. It was a new structure of 
psychological warfare against both Truman’s idea of containment and the Marshall Plan. 
Indeed, “both Soviet and American policymakers realized that to “win the minds of men” 
in Europe, they needed to appeal more to their cultural than to their political identity”4. 
More precisely, “culture in the study of international relations may be defined as the shar-
ing and transmitting of consciousness within and across national boundaries”5. I see two 
reasons for privileging this approach: firstly, all the post-war political identities were di-
luted in the common struggle against fascism; secondly, culture appeals to one’s sincere 
beliefs often situated outside the sphere of politics. Thus, cultural campaigns, infiltrating 
into the self of “cultural subjects”, covering its innermost political goals, “looking interest-
ing”, are by far the most efficient.
In the world of literature, the convention of fiction invites myth as a guest of reality; 
thus, “the novel rode escort to contemporary history”6, providing “Soviet and Western 
fictional responses to the Cold War”7 and shaping the consciousnesses of the readers. 
No later than April 1949, the Cominform organized the World Congress of Advocates of 
Peace in Paris, including key official Soviet writers (Aleksander Fadeev and Ilya Ehren-
3 Kennan George to George Marshall (Long Telegram) // Truman Library. Harry S. Truman Adminis-
tration File. Elsey Papers. 1946. February 22. P. 5.
4 Gienow-Hecht J. C. E. Culture and the Cold War in Europe // The Cambridge History of the Cold 
War. In 3 vols / eds M. P. Leffler, O. A. Westad. Cambridge, 2010. Vol. 1. P. 401.
5 Iriye A. Culture and International History // Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations 
/ eds M. J. Hogan, T. G. Paterson. Cambridge, 2004. P. 242.
6 Caute D. Politics and the Novel during the Cold War. New Brunswick & London, 2009. P. 351.
7 Ibid. P. 1.
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burg). As for the US, they just began to organize their “Deminform”8, which resulted in 
the Congress of Cultural Freedom whose opening ceremony took place in June 1950 in 
Berlin. The Congress was an instrument to rally the European elites, and, first of all, writ-
ers, against the communist camp. Thus the “book war” started, but the Soviet Union was 
certainly a well-trained fighter.
At the beginning of the Cold War, the Soviet Union had already had some twenty 
years experience in literary propaganda. During the 1930s the Red Army viewed fiction 
as “one of the most powerful tools for the organization and education of the masses”9. 
The First Congress of the Soviet Writers held in 1934 coined the definition of “Socialist 
Realism”. As Yuri Olesha put it, the writer is “the engineer of human souls” whose task is to 
make people support the Party and its struggle for the victory of Communism. This doc-
trine was still maintained after his death. At the Second Congress in 1954, Aleksei Surkov, 
First Secretary of the Directorate of the Writers’ Union, proclaimed that, “Literature is the 
sharp-edged weapon of socialist-political action. It is tightly connected to politics and is 
subordinate to the latter”10.
More importantly, Socialist Realism was — or, at least, ought to have been — a mass 
phenomenon. “By saying “readers”, one implies “people”. In our country almost every 
literate person is a reader, because to the illiterate, they are rare; it is an anomaly. The 
“people-reader” believes us, the Soviet writers”11, said one Socialist Realist classic. Such 
“people-reader” (or “worker-readers”12) was a great asset in the cultural war. Hence, Soviet 
literature had the strongest social dimension. As Vera Dunham argues, “literature [stands] 
between the regime and the people and [constitutes] the conversation between the two”13. 
It is an agora made of words where members of society can meet and deal with political 
issues. Besides, many fiction writers used to take over a political function, producing texts 
with totally political content. That is, for example, the case of Nikolai Shpanov (“The Dip-
lomats with a Cloak and Dagger”, 1952 or “Writer and Vigilance”, 1953), and Orest Malt-
sev (“Tito’s Chronicler”, 1949). Because of this social interaction, “literature [is] not only 
a receiver of signal but a sender of them <…> [and] the most dominant existential clichés 
of Stalinism derive from literary models”14.
In this mass production, enemy is the true hero of fiction. Along with the cult of the 
positive hero, the figure of the enemy is also central in novels and films of late Stalinism. 
Often being the trigger of the plot, the enemy is also the point at which all the actions of 
the protagonists converge, and once he is unmasked and disappears from the scene, the 
story ends. Indeed, the enemy is also the main character in Cold War mythology.
8 Saunders F. S. Who Paid the Piper? The CIA and the Cultural Cold War. London, 2000. P. 57.
9 Boevoi otriad na fronte literatury // Literaturnaia Gazeta. 1930. August 5, quoted in: Hooker M. T. 
The Military Uses of Literature. Fiction and the Armed Forces in Soviet Literature. Westport, 1996. P. 2.
10 Surkov A. A. O sostoianii i zadachakh sovetskoi literatury // Vtoroi s’ezd sovetskikh pisatelei. Steno-
graficheskii otchet. Moscow, 1956. P. 31. 
11 Kochetov V. A. Writer and Reader // Neva. 1955. Nо. 1. P. 175, quoted in: Dobrenko E. The Making of 
the Soviet Reader. Social and Aesthetic Contexts of the Reception of Soviet Literature. St. Petersburg, 1997. 
P. 11.
12 Geldern J. von. Epic Revisionism and the Crafting of a Soviet Public // Epic Revisionism: Russian 
History and Literature as Stalinist Propaganda / eds K. M. F. Platt, D. Brandenberger. Madison (WI), 2006. 
P. 333.
13 Dunham V. S. In Stalin’s Time: Middleclass Values in Soviet Fiction. Cambridge, 1976. P. 25.
14 Clark K. The Soviet Novel: History as a Ritual. Chicago, 1981. P. 253.
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Generally, there can be two approaches to the figure of enemy: subjective and ob-
jective. On the one hand, the very concept of enmity is often put into doubt by a number 
of the authors who studied the topic — that is the subjective approach15. On the other 
hand, in my research, I consider that the enemy has an objective dimension by the simple 
material rivalry of interests. This is true for the contest between two empires when the 
very existence of one empire questions the universal value of the other. By and large, in 
geopolitics and, in particular, in the case of the Cold War, it seems difficult to define the 
enemy as a sort of delusion we have to struggle with and, eventually, deny it as such. That 
is why I support the objective definition of the enemy, in the wake of Schmitt’s theory16.
Carl Schmitt (1888–1985) is the main thinker of enmity. A German jurist and a po-
litical theorist, he remains controversial due to his allegiance to the Nazi regime. How-
ever, his academic works influenced many philosophers and political authors, including 
Giorgio Agamben, Hannah Arendt, Jacques Derrida, and Slavoj Žižek. Schmitt defines 
the enemy as the genesis of any political and cultural struggle, “the specific political dis-
tinction to which political actions and motives can be reduced is that between friend and 
enemy”17. In other words, according to Schmitt, the distinction between friend and enemy 
represents the extreme degree of unity or disunity, so the essence of the political. In the 
next sentence, he postulates that “this provides a definition in the sense of a criterion and 
not as an exhaustive definition”. Such a criterion is particularly appropriate in the Soviet 
case. Hence, official literature, with its wide collections of characters, friends and foes, 
mirrors the ideology of the party. By studying the enemy in various Socialist Realist nov-
els, my goal is to identify the political discourse at the time.
Besides, Russian sociologist Lev Gudkov does not question Schmitt’s hypothesis, 
pointing to the archaic instinct to share the world between “we-them”18. He even extends 
it by saying that it creates a culture of fear and hope, and political consciousness capable 
of mobilizing the masses; he defines the paradox of enmity as a “necessary lethal threat”. 
Yet, by mobilizing itself against the enemy and the threat it stands for, the Soviet Union 
expresses itself as a vital organism making its ideological choices. In other words, to rep-
15 Some authors, like Sam Keen (Faces of the Enemy: Reflections of the Hostile Imagination. San 
Francisco, 1986), and James A. Aho (This Thing of Darkness: A Sociology of the Enemy. Seattle & London, 
1994) consider the concept of enemy as a somewhat artificial construction. To them, the other would be a 
projection of a part of ourselves that we cannot stand, of our “dark side”. Keen cherishes the hopes of Homo 
amicus to whom he devotes the last chapter of his book; Aho tries psychoanalytically to deconstruct the 
enemy revealing his nature as a shadow of our own fears, and thus being totally unoriginal. Droit, whose 
work is focused on the term “barbarian” (for him it is an equivalent to enemy) eventually concludes that it 
would be “wiser” to get rid of the very concept of “barbarian”. Hence, according to Droit, any enunciation 
of a norm or cultural standard is denounced as totalitarian, see: Généalogie des barbares. Paris, 2007. As 
for Robert Robins and Jerrold Post, they consider the perception of an enemy as a “political paranoia” that 
must be fought against; paranoia is a mental illness developed to avoid “the humiliation of helplessness”, see 
Political Paranoia: The Psychopolitics of Hatred. New Heaven; London, 1997. P. 301. — Aleksander Fateev 
is more pragmatic: to him the concept of the enemy is nothing else than the gimmick of power to “make 
the Soviet people fool and control them”, see: The image of the Enemy in Soviet Propaganda, 1945–1954. 
Moscow, 1999.
16 Among other reinterpretations of the concept of enemy, one can find Borkenau F. The Totalitarian 
Enemy. London, 1940; Volkan V. The Need to Have Enemies and Allies. From Clinical Practice to Interna-
tional Relationships. Lanham, 1997, and Seniavskaia E. S. The Perception of the Enemy by the World Wars 
Soldiers // Voprosy Istorii. 1997. Nо. 3. P. 140–156.
17 Schmitt C. The Concept of the Political. Chicago, 2007. P. 26.
18 Gudkov L. Ideologema “vraga”: “vragi” kak massovyi sindrom i mekhanizm sotsiokul’turnoi inte-
gratsii // The Concept of the Enemy / ed. by L. Gudkov. Moscow, 2005. P. 15.
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resent the enemy in artistic works is to construct its own identity. During the early Cold 
War period, the Soviet writers often resorted to the perception of the enemy in order to 
create the image of a common communist camp. After the Stalin-Tito split in 1948, Yugo-
slav President Joseph Tito turned out to be a perfect option for conveying the role of such 
an enemy.
Orest Maltsev’s Yugoslav Tragedy: The Case of a Tarpeian Book
After the war, the Red Army took Eastern Europe, and the Soviet Empire acquired 
new borders and a new critical mass. The foundation of the Cominform, and the economic 
and ideological tightening up was welcomed by the majority of the communists in Eastern 
Europe. Yugoslavia, however, with Tito as a “national communist”, who led the resistance 
movement during the war, was a black sheep19. When the latter started, the Soviet Union 
was still bound by the Ribbentrop — Molotov pact. So when the Yugoslav peasants joined 
the Communist Party, they were more urged by the defence of their motherland than by 
Marxist-Leninist ideology. During the war, there were frequent conflicts between Tito, 
who was asking for help in the struggle not only with Germans, but also with his domestic 
rivals, and Stalin who did not consider the Yugoslav front the major one. After the war, 
Yugoslavia refused to obey Stalin since the Red army was called to other fronts. Thus, the 
role of the Yugoslav communists in their own national liberation deprived Moscow of the 
legitimacy to impose its unshared authority on them after the war. The conflict took a 
dramatic turn, especially after three particular incidents.
Firstly, despite the fact that Yugoslavia followed the Soviet economic model, Tito’s 
regime was not willing to implement reforms on behalf of the Soviet Union and rejected 
Stalin’s attempts to transform the country into a Soviet satellite as well as refused The 
Marshall Plan aid. Secondly, Tito began to lay claim to the leadership of the Communist 
countries in Eastern Europe. During the liberation of Trieste by his army, he affirmed his 
regional leadership by demanding that Istria, Zara and Fiume be “given back” to Yugosla-
via. Stalin, fearing to hurt the Italian communists, did not back Tito. Later, Tito went as far 
as to propose a Balkan federation. Thirdly, Tito’s active support of the Greek rebels against 
the British influence had irritated Stalin who wanted to avoid a conflict with his Western 
allies at any cost. In February 1948, Stalin called Tito in Moscow, but the latter declined 
the invitation, alleging illness. Consequently, Stalin enforced economic sanctions against 
Yugoslavia and the leaders started exchanging letters in which Stalin was blaming Tito for 
violation of the communist dogma, for being a Trotskyite and for his lack of democracy. 
As for Tito, he defended his vision of a “national communism”.
From the summer of 1948 until Stalin’s death, a pitiless anti-Yugoslav campaign was 
launched by Soviet political authorities and media. To understand all its intensity, one 
has to keep in mind that, like Berlin, Yugoslavia was a frontline of the cultural war. For 
the Soviet leaders, moving backwards would have meant a “bandwagon” effect and could 
eventually have led to the collapse of the Soviet bloc as a whole. In June 1948, Stalin ex-
pelled Yugoslavia from the Cominform and urged the “loyal Yugoslav” to get rid of the 
“Tito clique”, but these measures only strengthened the Yugoslav unity against its adver-
19 On the relationship between Stalin and Tito, see: Gurchenko Y. S. Stalin  — Tito. Moscow, 1991. 
P. 342, et passim, and West R. Tito and the Rise and the Fall of Yugoslavia. London, 1994. P. 269–302.
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sary. During the year of the economic blockade (1949–1952), Tito turned to America for 
help and introduced decentralization and principles of market economy (demand, supply, 
profit) in his country. Tito’s separate road to socialism dramatically challenged the com-
munist dogma and Stalin’s project to integrate Eastern Europe in one monolithic bloc. 
Under the accusations of “rootless cosmopolitanism” and “national nihilism”, Titoism was 
declared treason. From the autumn of 1949, a large purge was launched in communist 
parties throughout Eastern Europe and even in Soviet society itself: certain politicians and 
writers were accused of subversive actions and of collaboration with Marshal Tito and the 
Western intelligence services. In November 1949, the Cominform enforced the resolution 
“The Yugoslav Communist Party in the hands of murderers and spies”. Even sport became 
part of the game: at the 1952 Helsinki Olympics, the Soviet football team was defeated by 
the Yugoslavs. What follows was that the inglorious team was broken up, the coach and 
some players had to return their previous awards for having “undermined the prestige of 
Soviet sport and Soviet state”. Records of the Ministry of State Security are testimony to 
Stalin’s plan to murder Tito (spraying bacteria of pneumonic plague!)20, but his death in 
1953 left this plan unrealized.
The author of our case study, Orest Maltsev (1906–1972), was born in the region of 
Kursk. In 1920, he was a volunteer in the Red Army. After he earned a diploma in liter-
ature, Maltsev worked for the newspapers “Krasnaya Zvezda” and “Na strazhe”. As a war 
correspondent, he accompanied the Soviet troops moving from the North Caucasus to 
Belgrade, Budapest and Vienna, and took part in the liberation of Western Ukraine.
With an opportunistic mind, as early as 1948, Maltsev seized the Stalin-Tito split to 
begin a new novel following the Party line tenets. Three years later “The Yugoslav Trage-
dy” came out. The plot of the novel is simplistic in the Socialist Realistic sense of the term: 
“The Yugoslav Tragedy” (1951) describes the struggle of the Yugoslav resistance fighters 
against Hitler’s army. Due to the confrontation between Stalin and Tito, Moscow urgently 
needed to denigrate the importance in their own liberation of the Yugoslav communists in 
order to establish the Soviet authority. In this context, it is no surprise that the description 
of the fighters is unkind and even grotesque. 
The Yugoslavs — and among them Tito in particular — are reproached for their na-
tionalism, which indirectly follows “the old plan of Hitler and Mussolini for the Balkans: 
to gather them as a colonial possession and turn into a huge military bastion to launch 
attacks on the European countries. The Balkan Slavs, as well as the Greeks, the Romanians 
and Hungarians would be employed as cannon fodder at the disposal of the “Aryan race”. 
Being under the Fascist boot, precisely, under these conditions of tension and humiliation, 
local — and even tribal — chauvinism was blooming as never before”21 (280). Thus, in 
spite of their positive struggle against Hitler, the Yugoslavs appear to be his strategic ac-
complices. Moreover, they are described as primitive: “— Moscow! Moscow! Do you hear 
us? <…> We inform you, fere (druzhe) Stalin, we’re defeating heavily the fascists. Thank 
you for your help and for the machine guns. Send us anything else, and in a mass. But 
20 Dubinianskii M. Iosif vs. Iosip. 60 let nazad v SSSR startovala the anti-Yugoslav Campania // Gazeta 
ZN, UA. 2008. September 5. Available: http://zn.ua/SOCIETY/iosif_vs_iosip__60_let_nazad_v_sssr_star-
tovala_antiyugoslavskaya_kampaniya.html (accessed 05.09.2018).
21 Maltsev O. The Yugoslav Tragedy. Moscow, 1952. — Pages of the quotations are mentioned between 
brackets.
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more importantly, let your soldiers come quicker; we alone are in a very hard situation. 
Hello! Hello! <…> Hey, cretin, open your eyes, the transmitter doesn’t work!” (323) and 
they are also materialist, hypocritical and opportunistic: “Tito is a secret friend of the 
members of the Labor Party, but shouts from the rooftops his loyalty to the Soviet Union” 
(222). Naturally, the book is full of American and British spies, who aimed to make profits 
from the war.
Due to his acerbic condemnation of the “traitor” in the novel, along with several ar-
ticles, which appeared in newspapers, the stalwart of Socialist Realism, Orest Maltsev was 
awarded the Stalin Prize (second grade) in 1952. Half a million copies were sold, the book 
underwent more than ten re-editions, and the author signed a contract for a film adapta-
tion22. He became rich and enjoyed a luxurious dacha in Peredelkino.
A general reception of the book by the critics was positive. The playwright Geor-
gi Mdivani (1905–1981), in his article “History of treason”23, praised the veracity of the 
novel: “Using historically faithful and documentary means, the book explains that during 
World War II Tito was an agent of the Gestapo <…> his action contributed to the re-
moval of a big part of the Nazi army from the Balkans and to its direction towards the 
Soviet Union <…> also the author gives an account on the true love of the Yugoslav resis-
tance fighters for Comrade Stalin. He shows that the former were trapped in a network of 
treason. The tragedy of the Yugoslav people relies on the fact that at that time they kept 
believing in Tito’s clique, whereas he had destroyed national heroes and wanted to trans-
form Yugoslavia into a bridgehead of American imperialism”. Regardless of his ideological 
approval, Mdivani points to some negligence in the style, and regrets that the number of 
pages devoted to the enemy camp prevails over the national theme. Ironically, five years 
before this criticism, Mdivani had been the scriptwriter of a film by Abram Room entitled 
“In the Yugoslav Mountains” (1946). The plot deals with… the common struggle of the 
Red Army with Yugoslav peasants, and Tito’s fighters against the Nazi invader. Needless to 
say, the film was forbidden in the Soviet Union after the Stalin-Tito split. In an interesting 
manner, it was also prohibited in Yugoslavia for several decades, even after Khrushchev’s 
settlement of the conflict. The writer Yurii Libedinskii (1898–1959) shared Mdivani’s en-
dorsement, stressing that the novel “answered to the readers’ demand on international 
events <…> and presented the Trotskyite-spy Tito crew and their machinations to seize 
power”. To put it briefly, the book brought to light “truth, so to speak, from the inside” 
(pravda, tak skazat, iznutri)24.
But critics were not unanimous. In their “Remarks on the Manuscript of the Yugoslav 
Tragedy”25, two members of the “Znamia” editorial board I. Medvedev and N. Bondar’ 
reproached Maltsev for repeating Tito’s arguments when he overestimated the extent of 
the liberation struggle in Yugoslavia (with a ratio of power of 6 against 1 in favour of the 
foe). The author failed to properly mention Stalingrad heroes, whose role was presented 
as diversion to draw the Nazis to themselves. The critics underlined that unlike the Brit-
ish policy in Yugoslavia, Maltsev characterized the American one as “unclear”, whereas 
22 Script of the Film Double Face Written in 1954–1955 // Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv literatury 
i isskustva (future — RGALI). F. 2453. Op. 3. L. 2074–2076
23 Mdivani G. Literaturnaia Gazeta. 1951 // RGALI. F. 631. Oр.3. Edinitsa Khranenia 266. L. 306–315.
24 Libedinskii Y. // RGALI. F. 1099. Op. 2. Edinitsa Khranenia 116. L. 77–85. 
25 Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv sotsial’no-politicheskoi istorii (future — RGASPI). F. 17. Op. 137. 
Edinitsa Khranenia 629 L. 96–100.
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“it was totally clear”. They also deplored many factual mistakes in the role of the Soviet 
mission; in translations of Serbian words, names of some villages and dates when certain 
regions were liberated; in the duties, actions or travels of personalities of the time. Andrich 
Ratomir added many other geographical and tactical mistakes to the list of inaccuracies26. 
At the time of his criticism, he was the editor of the newspaper “For a socialist Yugoslavia!” 
In 1943, he was Major-General Commandant of a regiment of resistance fighters in South 
Serbia, and recommended the Writers’ Union to organize a meeting between himself and 
Maltsev to correct certain mistakes that diminished the significance and sharpness of the 
novel to the Yugoslav reader. In his view, it would be wiser for the author to remove the 
whole first part since it takes place in Eastern Serbia, although resistance fighters’ move-
ments were active in the South of the country. By the way, it is noticeable that Ratomir’s 
paper dates from July 18, 1952, i.e. four months after the book had been awarded the Stalin 
Prize. Such drastic criticism of a work that had just been declared as the benchmark of the 
Party line testifies that relative amplitude existed in the postwar literary debates. At least 
there was a debate.
But in spite of the prestige of the award, the book was harshly criticized by Maltsev’s 
peers and many of them even “stopped greeting him when they met in the street”27. Log-
ically, some people suspected that with this book, Maltsev was a Kremlin representative, 
and the rumor even spread that he resorted to a ghostwriter. The latter might have been 
the war veteran Vladimir Gurvich, the son of Nicholas I. Hourwich (Americanized ver-
sion), one of the founders of the American Communist Party. On the pretext of parasit-
ism, MVD organized for Gurvich’s removal from his job and from his Moscow flat. Then 
he may have written “The Yugoslav Tragedy” to earn his living28. In 1955, when Khrush-
chev restored diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia, the book was withdrawn from all the 
libraries, the project of the film was dropped, and the courtier Maltsev fell into disfavor 
and poverty. He became a casualty of the versatile Party line.
After this presentation of the “Yugoslav Tragedy”, I want to put forward my main 
thesis and argue that Maltsev’s work is a ‘Tarpeian book’, that is to say, a case of empire 
building through fiction in a way that brings to mind an edifying punishment. Firstly, I 
repeat that I am not dealing here with high calibre literature, but with a pure political text. 
It can be compared to the article by the same author on Vladimir Dedier entitled “Tito’s 
Chronicler” (1949)29, where the latter is accused of presenting himself as a fervent Serbi-
an nationalist and at the same time, of despising the Serbian people. Maltsev considers 
him an agent of the United States and adds that when he was a student, he looked like an 
American gangster. Furthermore, he points out several inaccuracies in Tito’s war diaries 
written by Dedier, challenging — just like in the novel — his prestige as a resistance fight-
er. The same cliché on the American influence in Eastern Europe and on “the Tito’s clique” 
can be found in the novel “Plotters” (1951) by Nikolai Shpanov. Half a million copies had 
26 Ratomir A. 1952. June 18 // RGALI. F. 631. Op. 20. Edinitsa Khranenia 110. L. 33–36.
27 Interview of Evgenii Evtushenko // Komsomol’skaia Pravda. 1999. April 28.
28 Svirskii G. Na Lobnom Meste. Literatura nravstvennogo soprotivleniia. 1946–1986. M., 1998.
29 Maltsev O. Titovskii letopisets. Vlado Dedier i ego razoblacheniia //  Literaturnaia Gazeta. 1949. 
April 25 // RGALI. F. 634. Op. 3. Edinitsa Khranenia 168. L. 54–59.
Вестник СПбГУ. История. 2019. Т. 64. Вып. 1 101
been sold when the book was forbidden in 1956 for the same reason as Maltsev’s book. 
One can quote many other examples30.
This political fiction fulfils the function of storytelling, as defined by Brian Boyd, “In 
order to assess novel or problematic situations human minds can draw not only on our 
individual present and species’ past, as all minds can do, but also on their individual pasts, 
even on particular episodes, and can consider projected futures, as they turn ideas around 
through a possibility space enlarged by the dimensions of the hypothetical and the coun-
terfactual”31. Hence, the fictional narrative transforms the perception of political reality.
Following Michel Foucault’s bi-functional nature of power32, one can argue that in 
Maltsev’s description of the Yugoslav enemy, not only does the Soviet regime punish guilty 
behavior, but it also legitimizes itself by enhancing the Soviet prestige at war (the indisput-
able winner vs. the shameful resistance fighters) and so reinforcing the Soviet values. One 
can find an example in the exchange between the Russian hero and Katnych, a resistance 
leader (340–341). Katnych reads one of his texts exposing his political views and boasting 
about the situation of Yugoslavia, “at the heart of the heart of the world” (Europe) and 
pretending to be the best of the Balkan nations, which realizes the combination between 
Western culture and communism. Then the narrator “sets the record straight” and men-
tions the Yugoslav debt to the Russian army in the 19th and 20th centuries to gain its in-
dependence, mocks his cultural pretentions (“this half-feudal culture here, where people 
still write with a wooden plough and maintain with each other relations of arbitrary rule 
and slavery)”. This symbolic punishment is a reminder of the “Tarpeian rock” in ancient 
Rome33. Initially, the legend says that while Rome was besieged by the Sabine king Titus 
Tatius, Tarpeia, daughter of the commander of the citadel, promised Tatius that she would 
give him entry to the city, if she received “what the Sabine bore on their left arms” as 
payment, i.e. their bracelets. But instead they crushed her to death with their shields and 
hurled her body from the Capitoline Hill34. From then on, the traitors were executed by 
30 Gribanov B. Banda Tito — Orudie Amerikano-Angliiskih Podzhigatelei Voiny. M., 1951.
31 Boyd B. The Origin of Stories. Evolution, Cognition and Fiction. Cambridge (MA), 2009. P. 49.
32 Foucault M. Discipline and Punish: the Birth of the Prison. Paris, 1975.
33 Dumézil G. Tarpeia. Essais de philologie comparative indo-européenne //  Mythes et dieux de la 
Scandinavie ancienne. 1st ed. Paris, 2000, 1947. P. 7–43. — Dumézil’s analysis of Tarpeia, based on both my-
thological and anthropological considerations, suggests an interesting interpretation of the Soviet-Yugoslav 
relations and fits surprisingly well into Cold War confrontation. So, from this perspective, the Soviet Union 
was standing for the Romans, the people of warriors opposing to the US and its capitalist allies, a modern 
avatar of the Sabines, the people of wealth. The role of Tarpeia was given to Yugoslavia, subject to moral 
corruption (Tito disowned the communist dogma) and to greed for gold (Maltsev and the Soviet press have 
often used the expression “Tito’s clique” to design them as gangsters). As Dumézil points out: “Tarpeia <…> 
has been viewed as the experimental demonstration of a power which, taken in itself, deserves nothing but 
the blames of moralists, a modern form of Tatius’ shields (p.34)”. At the dawn of the 1950s, Tarpeia, think 
Yugoslavia, was symbolically crushed not by shields, but by the Soviet official writers’ novels. As a historical 
and political consequence, the story of Tarpeia founded a new world order: “To be sure, the myth narrates 
about a war, however its center of gravity is in the long concluding exposition that settled the actual world 
order <…> like in the myths of creation, the chaos is firstly mentioned to make the order appear out of it”, 
see p.11. Hence, the punishment of Tarpeia for her treason and eventually her reintegration into the Roman 
imperial memory through her cult (Dumézil mentions libations in honor of Tarpeia’s Manes, see p. 42) was 
mirrored in Maltsev’s novel, which justifies the Soviet hegemony over Yugoslavia by Tito’s betrayal. Howe-
ver, the Soviet split with Yugoslavia was followed by Khrushchev’s restoration of his relations with Tito in 
1955. Finally, the Tarpeian narrative implies that the Soviet Union would finally triumph over and absorb 
the West, like Romulus the Sabines.
34 Livy. The Rise of Rome / transl. by T. J. Luce. Book I. Oxford; New York, 1998. P. 11, 5–9. 
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being thrown from the cliff, and this carried a stigma of shame. This situation is similar to 
the Yugoslav case, justifying the qualification of Maltsev’s text as a “Tarpeian book”.
It is interesting to note that the aim of such an empire by fiction is to have a specific 
impact on perception of the reader at the centre as well as at the periphery of the bloc. 
On the one hand, the strong effect on the people’s republics can be measured through 
criticism and readers’ letters. For example, the novel spurred an intense reaction in the 
Bulgarian press, and there was even an exchange of letters between the author himself and 
a group of Bulgarian frontier guards35. The same effect can be observed in the RSFSR, at 
the centre of the empire, where the perception of a periphery arose in the Soviet readers’ 
shaping of an imperial consciousness. This process was carefully sustained by discussion 
groups at the local level. Thus, in the municipal library of Kokchetavo (Kokshetau since 
1993), a city in the province of Northern Kazakhstan, conferences and evening readings 
were regularly organized and dedicated to Stalin Prize winners, including Orest Maltsev’s 
“Yugoslav Tragedy”36.
Abroad, the propaganda machine was resorting to its wide international networks; 
such was the case with “Parallèle 50”37, a Franco-Czech journal conveying Moscow’s mes-
sage about Maltsev’s novel, “the novelist didn’t produce a fiction but a documentary… on 
Tito’s conspiracy to seize power… after reading this book, we hope that the Yugoslav peo-
ple will be free from its today oppressors”38. In doing so, the Soviet power led the literary 
offensive, targeting readers of the Western bloc. The Soviet empire by fiction extended 
beyond the ideological borders to challenge the European narrative on its own territory.
The study of Maltsev’s novel gives us some insight into the imperial policy of the 
late Stalinist Soviet Union emphasizing the specific way to avoid any “ideological disso-
nance”39. We call it “Tarpeian book” for it is a reminder of the punishment of the traitors 
in ancient Rome playing the role of the ostracised in the communist bloc. In this sense, 
the Soviet “Empire by fiction” demonstrates an undeniable symbolic component within 
its materialistic dimension. Indeed, the Party line was more decisive than any military 
goal per se. In the evolution of Soviet doctrinal debates, Tito’s official return to favour in 
1955 was the prologue to the inversion of values that took place at the XX Party Congress.
As for the consequences of American policy, the Yugoslav crisis fed the diplomat 
George Kennan’s hope that other communist leaders “might already be infected by the 
35 Reactions in the press to Maltsev novel in 1953 // RGALI. F. 631. Op. 26. Edinitsa Khranenia 538. 
L. 34–35  and 62–63; Maltsev replies to a group of frontier guards concerning his book. 1953. March 26 
// RGALI. F. 631. Op. 21. Edinitsa Khranenia 539. L. 2. 
36 Tchernova V. Stalinskoie Znamia. 1952. December 16 // RGALI. F. 2175. Op. 2. Edinitsa Khranenia 
361.
37 Parallèle 50 was a communist journal financed by Prague. It came out in Paris from 1947 to 1952. 
The title reflected its European as well as geopolitical ambitions: the 50th Parallel joined Paris to Moscow 
through Prague. For more details, see: Noirant F. Parallèle 50: un périodique tchécoslovaque, communiste 
et parisien contre la division de l’Europe // Une Europe malgré tout. 1945–1990. Cultural, Intellectual and 
Scientific Contacts and Networks among Europeans during the Cold War / eds A. Fleury, L. Jílek. Bruxelles; 
Berne; Berlin, 2009. P. 383–398.
38 Parallèle 50. 1952. May 29 // RGALI. F. 631. Op. 26. Edinitsa Khranenia 2625. L. 10.
39 Krushinskii S. The Danger of Yugoslav Vanguardism. Report to Shepilov. 1955. July 8 //  Tsentr 
Khranenia Sovremennoi Dokumentatsii (future — TsKhSD). F. 5. Op. 30. Edinitsa Khranenia 121. L. 50–60, 
quoted in: Hopf T. Social Construction of International Politics: Identities and Foreign Politics. M., 1955–
1999. Ithaca; London, 2002. P. 112.
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Tito virus”. Hitherto, he recommended “fostering a heretical process” in Eastern Europe40. 
Thus, perhaps because he was reassured by the first cracks in the Eastern bloc, the inflex-
ible author of containment showed unusual appeasement and favoured negotiations with 
Moscow. Unfortunately, at the turn of the 1950s he lost his influence within the Depart-
ment of State and was not able to stop the McCarthyist purges. The cultural war would 
gather steam within the next decade.
From Imperial Consciousness to Imperial Fiction
After having gone through the case-study and demonstrated the existence of “Empire 
by fiction”, let us focus on the concepts of empire and imperial consciousness in the Cold 
war context and today. Besides, what is their impact on Soviet and Russian identities? 
During the Cold War, the very concept of empire had moved to the ideological field too 
and, consequently, had to be defined anew. The domination within the two blocs implied 
the acceptance of an economic system (liberalism vs. state control) and of a set of values 
(individual liberties vs. cult of the worker). The Cold War empires relied on the principle 
of “Soft Power” formulated by Joseph Nye41 and struggled to “win the hearts and minds”, 
“Traditionally the test of a great power was its strength. Today, however, the definition of 
power is losing its emphasis on military force <…> The factors of technology, education, 
and economic growth are becoming more significant in international power <…> new 
power resources, such as the capacity for effective communication and for <…> using 
international institutions, may prove more relevant”42. There is a “more attractive way of 
exercising power than traditional means <…> This second aspect of power — which oc-
curs when one country gets other countries want what it wants — may be called co-optive 
or soft power”43. Geir Lundestad considers that soft power was the monopoly of the West, 
“unlike the Soviet Union, which frequently had to rely on force, the United States was 
generally encouraged to take a more active interest in the outside world”44. As Cold War 
historian John Lewis Gaddis writes, by “empire” he means “a situation in which a single 
state shapes the behaviour of others, whether directly or indirectly, partially or completely, 
by means that can range from the outright use of force through intimidation, dependency, 
inducements, and even inspiration”45. In the Eastern bloc, this inspirational role was de-
voted to official literary production.
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the very idea of imperialism applied to this 
place of the world seems to have lost its accuracy. However, even now the Russian Federa-
tion remains the biggest territory reviving its imperial past often associated with President 
Putin’s policies. Let us glance at the evolution of this imperial narrative in the discourse 
of some remarkable contemporary Russian politicians and intellectuals. The writer and 
political dissident Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn (1918–2008) considered that the Bolshevik 
revolution was a tragedy in Russian history, and that the genuine cultural and political 
40 Hixson W. L. George F. Kennnan. Cold War Iconoclast. New York, 1989. P. 85.
41 Nye J. Soft Power // Foreign Policy. 1990. Vol. 80. P. 153–171.
42 Ibid. P. 154, 164.
43 Ibid. P. 166.
44 Lundestad G. Empire by Invitation? The United States and Western Europe, 1945–1952. P. 263.
45 Gaddis J. L. We Now Know: Rethinking the Cold War. Oxford, 1997. P. 27.
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roots of Russia are to be found in tsarism and orthodoxy, and he wanted to get rid of the 
“imperial doping”46.
The geopolitician Aleksandr Dugin (born in 1962), the leader of neo-eurasianism, 
was inspired by Sir MacKinder’s theory and identifies Russia with the Eurasian “heart-
land”. Following the Slavophil tradition47, he considers that Russia is the leader of the Eur-
asian space called to face the “Atlantic imperialism”. He praises Russian messianism and 
wants to restore the empire, supporting strategic alliances with Germany, Japan, and Iran.
For the Director General of Roscosmos — and former Russia’s ambassador to 
NATO — Dmitri Rogozin (born in 1963), “the Russian land has grown not by a process 
of colonization, but by the appropriation of big spaces without any violence. The Russian 
national consciousness was thus shaped jointly with the other ethnic groups living near 
by. Because of the wealth and natural resources, Russian people used to always be in a 
defensive position. This perception of one’s own territory is peculiar to an imperialistic 
view. It is an innate imperialism of large spaces that allows the territorial unity between 
Kaliningrad to the Kouriles Islands to be maintained. “Empire” is supposed to perceive 
this land as common, on a scale of “humanity” in the Dostoevskian sense”48.
As a result, even at the turn of the twenty-first century, there is a persistence of the 
imperial paradigm in Russian political discourse, but some questions remain: is it really 
a remnant of the tsarist — or the Soviet — empire, a host from the past hovering over the 
collective memory? Or, does it make any sense in today’s reality? And how does it appear 
in fiction that, being no longer directed by the State, mirrors the cultural and political 
climate of its time?
Looking back at Russian imperial consciousness, let us switch from the concept of 
“Empire by fiction” to the phenomenon of imperial fiction. As noted above, there is a 
mutual interdependence between the geopolitical architecture (empire) and the official 
literary production. Both reinforce each other: in the case of a growing empire, politics 
tends to support the imperial literature to legitimize their strategic aspirations. This lit-
erature has the effect of the empire-builder, creating symbolical political alliance and a 
feeling of historic necessity. Hence, the empire grows and strengthens thanks to its im-
perial narrative. Today one is surprised by the lack of imperial fiction. Russian contem-
porary prose is rather introspective, self-centred, if not minimalist. This is true even for 
authors of military prose like Andrei Guelassimov, who describes the war in Chechnya in 
Thirst (2002) through the prism of shame, vodka and despair — far from the epic times 
of Socialist Realism. I think this vacuum of imperial fiction is proof that, arguably, Putin’s 
Russia is not a new imperial state, but rather a construction built up from memory blocks 
mostly extending into its own past. Russian imperial consciousness is passive, bequeathed 
by tsarist times and the Soviet Union, and echoes the geographical scale of the country.
The study of the enemy in Maltsev’s novel gives us insight into the imperial policy of 
the late Stalinist Soviet Union, pointing out a specific way of using literary diplomacy in 
46 Solzhenitsyn A. Kak Nam Obustroit’ Rossiiu // Literaturnaia gazeta. 1990. No. 38. September. 
47 Trubetskoi N. Nasledie Chinguizkhana. M., 2017. 
48 Auclert R. Interview of Dmitrii Rogozin. Geopolitics of Russia: European culture with Russian val-
ues // Revue de Défense Nationale. 2012. Vol. 749. P. 137–139.
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order to avoid any “ideological dissonance”49. The creative impetus displayed by Stalinist 
prose is noteworthy, consisting in assigning their roles to political enemies inside the So-
viet narrative. I call it “Tarpeian book” because it is a reminder of the punishment of the 
traitors in ancient Rome. In this sense, the Soviet ‘Empire by fiction’ demonstrates a high 
symbolic component in spite of its materialistic dimension. To put it differently and resort 
to Nye’s terminology, the Soviet Union was no less a soft power than a hard one.
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